Judging others in the shadow of suspicion by Fein, Steven & Hilton, James L.
Motivation and Emotion, VoL 18, No. 2, 1994 
Judging Others in the Shadow of Suspicion I 
Steven Fein 2 
Williams College 
James  L. Hilton 
University of Michigan 
Previous research has found that when perceivers have reason to be suspicious 
of  the motives underlying an actor's behavior, they are likely to draw inferences 
about the actor's true disposition that reflect a relatively sophisticated style of  
attributional processing. The present research was designed to examine some 
of  the negative consequences that suspicion can have on perceivers" judgments. 
In each of  the three studies reported, some subjects were made suspicious about 
the motives o f  an actor on the basis of  contextual information surrounding 
the actor's behavior, rather than the behavior itself Results of  these studies 
suggest that, particularly when perceivers believe that the actions or motives o f  
the actor couM affect them, suspicion may cause perceivers to see the actor 
in a more negative light, even if the perceivers are not convinced that the actor's 
behavior was indeed affected by ulterior motives. 
Although trust between strangers may be a rare commodity in these 
cynical times, research concerning social perception is brimming with stud- 
ies that have demonstrated a remarkably robust tendency of perceivers that, 
on its surface, seems to reflect a rather naive and overly trusting nature. 
When individuals observe or learn about the behavior of a person about 
whom they have little or no prior information, they often draw inferences 
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about the person that reflect the tendency to take the person's behavior 
at face value. Indeed, even when there are multiple plausible and sufficient 
explanations for the behavior, perceivers often infer that the behavior re- 
fleets the actor's true personality or attitudes, rather than hesitate to draw 
any inferences about the actor until they can rule out the other potential 
explanations. 
This tendency to accept behavior at face value, which social psycholo- 
gists have called the correspondence bias, the fundamental attribution error, 
and the overattribution effect (e.g., see Gilbert & Jones, 1986) is quite ro- 
bust. Even in studies designed to make the situational constraint faced by 
an actor extremely salient and quite obviously sufficient as an explanation 
for the actor's behavior (e.g., Allison, Mackie, Muller, & Worth, 1993; 
Jones, 1979; Snyder & Jones, 1974), subjects have tended to draw dispo- 
sitional inferences about the actor that correspond to the behavior and that 
fail to take into sufficient account the situational factors that could have 
influenced the behavior. 
This attribution bias is important because, in addition to its robust- 
ness, it can affect judgments across a wide variety of everyday situations. 
It can help provide a link between discrimination and stereotyping, for ex- 
ample, as perceivers ascribe negative dispositions to individuals of particu- 
lar groups and fail to recognize the extent to which the behavior of these 
individuals has been constrained significantly by sociocultural obstacles and 
discrimination (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). 
The primary goal of the present paper is to review and extend a re- 
cent line of research that examines the effects that suspicion has on per- 
ceivers' tendencies to fall prey to this robust bias. More specifically, Fein, 
Hilton, and Miller (1990), Fein (1991), and Hilton, Fein, and Miller (1993) 
have reported a series of studies demonstrating that suspicion of  ulterior 
motives can be a powerful antidote to the correspondence bias. This work 
is reviewed briefly in this paper, and three new studies are reported that 
were designed to test further the effects of suspicion, particularly concern- 
ing the power of suspicion and the generalizability of its effects to contexts 
that are more involving to the subjects than were those found in previous 
research. More important, these studies also begin to examine some of the 
potential costs of suspicion. 
Suspicion and the Avoidance of the Correspondence Bias 
Fein et al. (1990) offered a working definition of suspicion as a state 
in which perceivers actively entertain multiple, plausibly rival, hypotheses 
about the motives or genuineness of a person's behavior. Moreover, sus- 
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picion involves the belief that the actor's behavior may reflect a motive 
that the actor wants hidden from the target of his or her behavior. In their 
studies, subjects who learned contextual information about an actor's be- 
havior that suggested (implicitly) that the behavior may have been influ- 
enced by ulterior motives were significantly less likely to make inferences 
reflecting the correspondence bias than were subjects who learned contex- 
tual information about strong situational constraint. 
Subjects in one of these studies (Fein et al., 1990, Study 1), for ex- 
ample, read both a speech that argued either for or against a particular 
proposition as well as the context in which the author ostensibly wrote 
the speech. Half of the subjects read that the author was instructed to 
argue as he did as part of his job. That is, he was not given a choice 
about whether to argue for or against the proposition. The other half of 
the subjects read that the author was given the freedom to choose to argue 
either for or against the proposition, but they also read that the author's 
superior had strong feelings about the proposition. This information was 
designed to suggest to the subjects that the author may have been moti- 
vated to write his speech in the direction advocated by his superior in 
order to ingratiate. The speech that subjects read was consistent with the 
assignment given to the author in the no-choice conditions and with the 
attitude of the superior in the ulterior motives conditions. The results in- 
dicated that although the information about the constraint in the no- 
choice conditions was quite salient and strong, subjects in these conditions 
tended to infer that the author's true attitude corresponded to the attitude 
expressed in his speech. The inferences made by the subjects in the ulte- 
rior motives conditions, in contrast, were not affected by the direction ar- 
gued in the speech. 
As Fein et al. (1990) discussed, it is important to note several things 
about these results. First, on the basis of subjects' open-ended responses, 
it was clear that the subjects in the ulterior motives conditions did not con- 
elude that the author was influenced by ulterior motives, but rather that 
he may have been. Second, it is not the case that the subjects in the no- 
choice conditions failed to recognize the situational constraint or that they 
dismissed it as too weak to account for the actor's behavior. When asked 
to estimate how many of 100 individuals in the author's position would 
have behaved as the author did, subjects in the no-choice conditions gave 
significantly higher estimates than did subjects in the ulterior motives con- 
ditions. Therefore, even though the former subjects recognized the strong 
situational constraint and believed that most individuals would have be- 
haved as the author did, they tended to fall prey to the correspondence 
bias. The subjects in the ulterior motives conditions, on the other hand, 
recognized that the author had free choice, but they tended to suspend 
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judgment about the author's true attitude because the plausibility that his 
behavior reflected ulterior motives rendered the behavior attributionally 
ambiguous. 
Explaining the Effects of Suspicion 
The finding that suspicion can help subjects avoid the correspondence 
bias was replicated across a number of studies, and is consistent with earlier 
research by Jones and his colleagues concerning ingratiation and strategic 
self-presentation (e.g., Jones, 1964; Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961). But why 
does suspicion have this effect and what can it tell us about the nature of 
the inference process? Given that explanations based primarily on salience 
and normativeness (e.g., Kelley, 1973; Reeder, 1993; Reeder & Brewer, 
1979) are not supported by the results of Fein et al. (1990) and Fein (1991), 
other accounts must be offered. 
The results reported in Fein et al. (1990), Hilton, Miller, Fein, and 
Darley (1990), Fein (1991), and Hilton et al. (1993) are consistent with the 
idea that suspicion triggers an unusually active and careful style of attribu- 
tional thinking, and it this approach that helps suspicious perceivers avoid 
the correspondence bias. That is, once suspicious, perceivers seem unusu- 
ally willing to devote cognitive resources to the question of why an actor 
behaved as he or she did, and they assess the relative plausibility (e.g., D. 
T. Miller, Turnbuil, & McFarland, 1989) of a variety of competing expla- 
nations. For example, Fein et al. (1990, Study 3) found that subjects who 
had been given reason to be suspicious of an actor were quite willing to 
make strong correspondent inferences from his behavior if they learned 
other information that rendered less plausible the explanation that the ac- 
tor would be influenced greatly by ulterior motives (see also Hilton et al., 
1993). Moreover, Fein (1991) found that suspicion about one actor led sub- 
jects to avoid the correspondence bias when making inferences about an- 
other actor whose behavior may have been affected by strong situational 
constraint, but they showed no unwillingness to make strong correspondent 
inferences about another actor when there was no particular reason to dis- 
count the actor's behavior. 
Suspicion, the Correspondence Bias, and Attributional Thinking 
The idea that the correspondence bias can be reduced by a more 
active, careful mind-set lends support to several current multiple-stage 
models of the dispositional inference process. These models divide the 
processes by which people infer dispositions from another's behavior into 
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multiple stages that differ in terms of how much cognitive effort is required 
(e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Jones, 1979; Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 
1988). According to these models, perceivers tend to immediately and auto- 
matically draw a correspondent inference from the actor's behavior. This 
inference serves as an anchor from which perceivers adjust their later in- 
ferences. To the extent that perceivers devote cognitive resources to the 
latter stage of adjustment, they will take into account situational factors 
and discount or augment the initially correspondent inferences. However, 
because perceivers are rarely able or motivated to devote sufficient cogni- 
tive resources to the relatively arduous task of adjustment, the correspon- 
dence bias emerges. 
The PresentResearch 
Although suspicion can lead perceivers to avoid the correspondence 
bias when making inferences relevant to an actor's behavior, the attribu- 
tional thinking that accompanies suspicion may come at some cost to both 
the perceiver and the actor. Specifically, the attributional thinking triggered 
by suspicion appears to cause perceivers to focus on the plausibility of the 
various potential explanations of an actor's behavior (e.g., Fein, 1991; Hil- 
ton et al., 1993). Because ulterior motives often offer such a plausible ex- 
planation for actors' behaviors, perceivers may be hard pressed to avoid 
allowing their suspicions about these motives to color their perceptions of 
the actors, particularly when the perceivers themselves could be affected 
by the actions and/or motives of the actor. For example, imagine a worker 
who observes his co-worker ask their boss if she would be interested in 
playing a weekly game of squash with her. Although it might be very plau- 
sible that the worker was genuinely interested in finding a squash partner 
and had heard that the boss enjoyed playing squash, it would also be highly 
plausible that the worker invited the boss in order to ingratiate, or to get 
some edge over the other workers. Although the worker who observes this 
invitation is likely to suspend judgment and draw no strong inference about 
the co-worker's true intentions, the very high plausibility that the co- 
worker's behavior may have been obsequious or conniving may make the 
perceiver see her in a more negative light. 
This possibility is likely to be particularly costly for the target of oth- 
ers' suspicions. Often through no fault of their own, actors may be the 
targets of others' suspicions because of the context in which their behavior 
occurred. In their studies on surveillance and trust, for example, Strickland 
and his colleagues (Strickland, 1958; Strickland, Barefoot, & Hockenstein, 
1976) and Kruglanski (1970) found that when subjects who played the roles 
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of supervisors were put in a situation in which they monitored one worker 
more closely than another, they were more distrustful of the former worker 
even though the workers' actual behaviors did not differ. The supervisors' 
own behavior, therefore, made them less willing to trust the more closely 
monitored worker, presumably because their own behavior made this 
worker's performance more attributionally ambiguous. This ambiguity 
stems from the fact that the honest and dependable work performed by 
the more closely monitored worker could be attributed either to the 
worker's disposition or to the fact that the supervisor was present so fre- 
quently, whereas the same work performed by the less closely monitored 
worker could not be discounted as easily as a function of the surveillance. 
Moreover, Strickland (1958) and Strickland et al. (1976) found that the 
supervisors tended to continue to monitor more closely the former worker 
even when they had the opportunity to monitor both workers' subsequent 
performances equally. Given the plausibility of the explanation that the 
closely monitored worker's very honest and dependable work was the result 
of the supervisor's presence, such a worker would have a very difficult time 
earning the supervisor's trust. 
The target of others' suspicions may be faced with a similar dilemma 
in more subtle contexts as well. The student who writes a wonderful speech 
that just happens to be consistent with his superior's own attitude, for ex- 
ample, may receive less than his fair share of accolades, particularly by his 
peers who may be competing for the good graces of their superiors, because 
of the high plausibility that the speech was written as it was simply to con- 
form to the opinions of the author's superior and not because it reflected 
the author's true, impassioned beliefs. The problem is particularly daunting 
because the target of others' suspicions may often have an extremely dif- 
ficult time dispelling the suspicions, given that suspicion of ulterior motives 
can render a wide range of behaviors attributionally ambiguous (e.g., simply 
writing a more impassioned speech will probably not eliminate suspicion). 
The negative effects of the perceivers' suspicions may emerge in other ways 
as well. For example, although the suspicious perceivers in the previous 
example may avoid any dispositional inference about the author's true at- 
titude (i.e., they neither conclude that he does believe in what he said nor 
conclude that he wrote what he did in order to please his superior), they 
may be quick to call the actor's motives into question at some future time. 
Similarly, although they may refrain from making fairly specific disposi- 
tional inferences based on the content of a target's behavior, suspicious 
perceivers may feel less warmly toward the suspect and may be quite willing 
to entertain and express negative thoughts about him or her. 
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STUDY I 
The studies reported in the present paper were designed to begin 
examining some of the costs of suspicion. In the first study, subjects' in- 
ferences about the actor's true attitude about an issue that was central to 
his behavior were assessed, as were their more general evaluations of the 
actor. It was predicted that suspicion would help subjects avoid falling prey 
to the correspondence bias in their inferences about the actor's true atti- 
tude but that it might cause perceivers' more general impression of  the 
actor to be more negative. The specific methods used in the study differed 
from those used in previous studies on suspicion in two important ways. 
First, in previous studies the effects of suspicion have been tested against 
a manipulation that consists of varying which of two opposing positions an 
actor advocates in a speech or essay. In the present study, the position 
remained constant but the extremity of the arguments was varied (e.g., 
Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971). The question addressed, then, 
was whether presenting subjects with information suggesting potential ul- 
terior motives would cause subjects to discount the words of the actor even 
when those words were very strongly worded. In other words, would sub- 
jects be less likely to suspend their judgment of the actor if the actor did 
not merely advocate a particular position but rather argued strongly and 
aggressively for it? 
Second, the subjects in the present study did not simply read about 
the behavior of some hypothetical actor and make inferences about him 
or her, as has been the case in numerous previous studies. Rather, these 
subjects believed that they were interacting with this actor. Moreover, the 
subjects in the suspicion conditions of this study had reason to suspect that 
the actor was trying to deceive them, rather than some hypothetical other 
person. 
This latter difference was of particular interest for several reasons. 
The experimental task faced by the subjects was much more involving and 
complex than that used in the previously reported studies on suspicion. 
This complexity was created in part to test whether the effects of suspicion 
on perceivers' inferences would emerge when the perceivers are not re- 
moved, impassionate observers of an obviously hypothetical actor but in- 
stead are part of the actor's context (or so they were led to believe). More 
specifically, subjects in this study were given a relatively complex story 
which asked them to play the role of a member of some organization. The 
subjects were run in small groups, and they were led to believe that their 
performance in the study would be affected by other subjects. Subjects 
heard a presentation ostensibly made by another subject that argued either 
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moderately or strongly in favor of a particular proposition. Half of  these 
subjects had no reason to suspect the motives of this other subject, but 
half had reason to suspect that he may have argued for this proposition 
to sabotage their own performance in the study. 
In addition to their inferences about the other subject's true attitude, 
the subjects were asked more general questions about him. It was predicted 
that in the involving context in which the subjects would be making their 
inferences in the present study, some negative effects of suspicion may be 
more likely to emerge. That is, suspicion about the other subject's true 
motives would cause subjects to refrain from making strong dispositional 
inferences about the other subject's true attitude, but that it would also 
make subjects more likely to see the other subject in a relatively negative 
light, such as in terms of how likeable the subjects would find him to be. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 77 undergraduate students at the University of Michi- 
gan who participated in order to fulfill the research requirements of their 
Introductory Psychology course. Subjects were assigned randomly to the 
four conditions. The data from 2 of the 77 subjects were dropped from all 
analyses because they did not understand the instructions. 
Cover Story and Instructions 
Subjects were run in small groups, though they were always led to 
believe that five other subjects were present during their session. Upon 
arriving, they were placed in individual cubicles and told that the study was 
designed to investigate the effectiveness of various kinds of communication 
networks in organizations. The subjects were told that they would each be 
asked to play a role in a mock organization. The experimenter next ex- 
plained that for the experiment to focus on communication networks and 
reduce the effects of nonverbal behaviors, the experiment required that all 
communication between subjects be through audiotaped messages that the 
subject would record and then send via the experimenter. The subjects then 
received a booklet that explained in some detail the structure and commu- 
nication network of their organization. 
Each subject was led to believe that the six subjects in their group 
were assigned different positions in the organization. In reality, however, 
each subject learned that he or she was "Subject No. 3" and that this meant 
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they would be placed in a middle management position that would consist 
of being in charge of a committee comprising themselves and two subjects 
in lower-level positions. The committee's primary responsibility would be 
to prepare and give reports and presentations to the subjects in the up- 
per-level positions. Each subject read, "You a r e . . ,  ultimately responsible 
for all reports that come out of your committee. The credit and blame go 
to you, and you alone. [The subjects in upper-level positions] have the 
power to reward and punish you. As head of the committee, you also have 
the power to reward and punish those beneath you." 
When the subjects indicated that they understood their role, they 
were told that the first communication they would receive was a presenta- 
tion from a particular subject in a lower-level position. (Hereafter, called 
the "presenter.") The subjects read that the presenter, a subordinate mem- 
ber of the committee of which they were in charge, was assigned to make 
a presentation about a proposal that several employees had made to upper 
management calling for the corporation to divest all of its holdings in South 
Africa. (At the time of the study, divestment was a relatively controversial 
topic on campus.) The subjects read the instructions apparently given to 
the presenter for this task. Included in these instructions was the following: 
Subjects No. 5 and No. 6 [the upper-level positions] have very strong personal 
opinions on this mat te r - - they  both feel the same way about the issue (either 
strongly in favor of or against this proposal). However, rather than simply make a 
decision about this proposal, they have asked Subject No. 3 to research and make 
recommendations about this issue to them. Though Subject No. 3 will be solely 
responsible for this presentation, he/she has given you the task of making the 
presentation to him/her. Subject No. 3 will then make a presentation to Subjects 
No. 5 and No. 6 based entirely on your presentation. 
The subjects also read that the presenter was given a copy of the original 
divestment proposal and rationale, as well as a counterproposal filed by 
other employees who were opposed to the proposal. 
Manipulation of Suspicion 
In addition to the general context of the presenter's task, the subjects 
were also given some information about the roles that the two subjects in 
the lower-level positions on their committee were asked to play. It was 
explained to the subjects that they were given access to this information 
because of their superior position "on the corporate ladder," and they were 
also told that these lower-level subjects would not be aware that any other 
subject would have access to this information. This information included a 
description not only of the presenter's and the other subject's places in the 
organization but also of the goals and values they were instructed to adopt. 
The subjects read two descript ions--one for the presenter and one for 
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the other subordinate w b u t  they were not told which description corre- 
sponded to which subject. 
In the no-suspicion conditions, both sets of information were quite 
innocuous. Ostensibly, one of the subordinates was asked to play the role 
of an intelligent, reliable but not terribly hard-working employee who would 
like to succeed in the organization but would not like a very high-pressure 
role. The other subordinate was asked to either play the same role or to 
play the role of an ambitious individual who was very motivated to rise up 
the corporate ladder by being very hard working and honest. Again, the 
subjects did not learn which role was given to which subordinate. 
Subjects in the suspicion conditions read the same innocuous infor- 
mation about one of the subordinates (i.e., intelligent, reliable, but not ter- 
ribly hard working), but they learned that the other subordinate's goal was 
either to try to rise up the corporate ladder by being very hard-working 
and honest or to try to rise by ruining Subject No. 3's [i.e., the actual sub- 
ject's] career so that he or she could take over that position. The subjects 
did not learn which role was given to the presenter and which was given 
to the other subordinate. Moreover, the subjects read that both subordi- 
nates had been told how the upper-level subjects felt about the divestment 
proposal. The true subjects, however, did not learn what this attitude was. 
Thus, the subjects in the suspicion conditions were given reason to suspect 
that the presenter may have been motivated to make them look bad to the 
upper-level subjects. In addition, the subjects should have also recognized 
the power that the presenter had to hurt the subject's "career" by sabo- 
taging the presentation, if he or she was so inclined. 
Manipulation of the Extremity of the Presentation 
Orthogonal to the manipulation of suspicion, the extremity of  the po- 
sition argued by the presenter was also varied. Half of the subjects heard 
a presentation that argued very strongly against divestment, and the other 
half heard a presentation that argued more moderately against divestment. 
The presentations were approximately equal in length and quality, but the 
former was much more one-sided and extreme in tone. 
Dependent Measures 
After they listened to the presenter's recorded presentation, the ex- 
perimenter came into the subjects' rooms and said that from time to time 
they would be asked to complete questionnaires about themselves and their 
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colleagues. The subjects were then given a sheet of questions about them- 
selves and about the presenter. The subjects were asked to infer the pre- 
senter's true attitude toward divestment. They were asked to use a scale 
that ranged from strongly against divestment (-5) to strongly in favor of  di- 
vestment (+5). The subjects were also asked to indicate how much they 
thought they would like the presenter as a person and colleague on a scale 
that ranged from strongly dislike (-5) to strongly like (+5), as well as to 
indicate how trustworthy they thought he was on a scale that ranged from 
not at all trustworthy (1) to very trustworthy (11). 
After completing the questionnaire, the subjects were told that the 
study was over and were debriefed fully. 
Results  
Inferences of the Presenter's True Attitude 
Subjects' inferences of the presenter's true attitude toward divestment 
were subjected to a 2 (Suspicion vs. No suspicion) x 2 (Moderate Speech 
vs. Extreme Speech) analysis of variance (ANOVA). It was predicted that 
subjects would tend to suspend judgment of the presenter's true attitude 
when they had reason to suspect the presenter's motives, and that the ex- 
tremity of the presentation would have a significant impact on the infer- 
ences only when the subjects had no reason to be suspicious. Consistent 
with predictions, a main effect for the manipulation of suspicion emerged, 
F(1, 71) = 10.67, p < .002, indicating that subjects were more likely to 
believe that the presenter was truly opposed to divestment in the no-sus- 
picion conditions (M = -1.66) than in the suspicion conditions (M = 0.00). 
A main effect also emerged for the manipulation of the presentation's ex- 
tremity, F(1, 71) = 6.88, p < .02, indicating that subjects who heard the 
extreme presentation tended to infer that the presenter was more opposed 
to divestment (M = -1.54) than did the subjects who heard the more mod- 
erate presentation (M = -0.22). Although the interaction was not signifi- 
cant, F(1, 71) = 2.40, p < .13, the pattern was consistent with the 
hypotheses, as can be seen in Fig. 1. More critically, simple-effects analyses 
revealed that the manipulation of the extremity of the presentation had a 
very strong and significant effect on subjects' inferences in the no-suspicion 
conditions, F(1, 71) = 9.20, p < .003, and that the effect of this manipu- 
lation was eliminated in the suspicion conditions, F(1, 71) < 1. 






° | -  
- 2 "  
-3 
Suspicion 
/ [ ]  Moderate 




Fig. 1. Inferences about the presenter's true attitude toward divestment 
as a function of the extremity of the presentation and whether or not 
subjects had reason to suspect the presenter's motives. 
Evaluations of the Presenter 
Subjects' ratings of how much they thought they would like the pre- 
senter as a person and colleague were also subjected to the two-way 
ANOVA. As predicted, a significant main effect for the manipulation of 
suspicion emerged, F(1, 71) = 8.15, p < .006. Subjects in the suspicion 
conditions tended to think that they would like the presenter significantly 
less than did the subjects in the no-suspicion conditions (Ms = 0.76 vs. 
2.15). Neither the main effect for the extremity of the presentation, nor 
the interaction, approached significance (both Fs < 1). 
Subjects' evaluations of the presenter's trustworthiness were also ana- 
lyzed. Once again, neither the main effect for manipulation of the extremity 
of the presentation, nor the interaction, approached significance (both Fs 
< 1). Similarly, although the means in the suspicion condition tended to 
be more negative (Msuspicion = 5.74 vs. Mno-suspicion = 6.54), the difference 
was not significant, F(1, 71) = 2.28, p < .14. 
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Discuss ion  
Consistent with previous work on suspicion, the results of the first 
study suggest that when perceivers have reason to suspect the motives un- 
derlying a target's behavior, they refrain from inferring that the target's 
true attitude corresponds to the attitude that the target expressed in a par- 
ticular situation. Subjects who had reason to suspect that the presenter may 
have argued for the position that he did to make them look bad did not 
infer that the presenter really was opposed to divestment, even if the pre- 
senter's arguments were very strongly worded. For these subjects, the ex- 
tremity of  the target's arguments was apparently not diagnostic of the 
presenter's true attitude. An extreme presentation could either mean that 
the presenter felt particularly strongly against divestment, or that the pre- 
senter wanted the subject to look especially bad to the subjects in the up- 
per-level management roles. In the absence of suspicion, the extremity of 
the presentation retained its diagnostic value. 
More centrally important for the present paper was the finding that 
subjects in the suspicion conditions disliked the presenter more than did 
the subjects in the no-suspicion conditions. Even though the subjects could 
not be sure if the presenter had any reason to behave in an insincere way, 
the possibility that he may have been motivated to sabotage the subject 
was enough to cause them to perceive him as less likeable. This finding 
suggests that if contextual information that a perceiver learns about a target 
person's behavior suggests that the target may have reason to try to dupe 
the perceiver and present himself or herself in an ingenuine way, the per- 
ceiver may hold this against the target and see him or her in a more nega- 
tive light. Even though previous studies have shown that the type of 
manipulation that elicited suspicion in this study tends to cause subjects to 
suspend judgment about whether or not the target's behavior was affected 
by ulterior mot ives- - ra ther  than simply conclude that the target was in- 
deed disingenuous--(e.g. ,  Fein, 1991; Fein et al., 1990), and even though 
suspicious subjects in this study did not infer that the presenter was indeed 
very untrustworthy, the present results suggest that target of these suspi- 
cions may not escape unscathed. The high plausibility of situationally 
grounded ulterior motives may be enough to lead perceivers to see the 
target more negatively. 
STUDY 2 
In the suspicion conditions of Study 1, subjects had reason to suspect 
not only that the presenter may have had ulterior motives but also that 
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these ulterior motives could sufficiently account for the presenter's behav- 
ior. That is, subjects had reason to believe that virtually anyone in the pre- 
senter's position could have behaved as he did if he were motivated to do 
so--regardless  of his true attitude (e.g., see Kelley, 1973; Reeder, 1993; 
Reeder & Brewer, 1979). In the shadow of such suspicion, the target is 
confronted with a very daunting challenge. Behaviors that typically might 
serve to indicate clearly where they stand on an issue--such as arguing 
quite strongly for a particular p o s i t i o n -  are likely to lose their potency in 
the face of the attributional ambiguity. 
There are other situations, however, in which the targets of suspicion 
are not so helpless. If perceivers suspect that a target is motivated to appear 
well versed in music, for example, they would have a difficult time discounting 
the target's behavior if that behavior involved answering quickly and expertly 
a variety of questions about Mozart's Minuet from the Divertimento in D, 
Eddie Lang's guitar work while playing under the pseudonym "Blind Willie 
Dunn," and bootleg recordings of Bruce Springsteen's benefit concerts for 
the Christic Institute. Reeder, Messick, and their colleagues (e.g., Messick & 
Reeder, 1972, 1974; Reeder, Messick, & Van Avermaet, 1977), as well as 
Hilton and Fein (Fein, 1991; see Hilton et al. 1993), have found that per- 
ceivers are likely to draw correspondent dispositional inferences from a tar- 
get's behavior if that behavior reflects an ability that cannot be faked easily, 
even if the perceivers have reason to suspect that the target may have had 
ulterior motives to act as he or she did. Suspicious perceivers, therefore, do 
not become rigid in their hesitancy to take behavior at face value. But do 
they hold targets accountable for the suspicion in some other way? 
Study 2 was designed to examine this issue by giving subjects a rela- 
tively weak negative expectancy about a target along with a relatively strong 
behavioral disconfirmation of that expectancy. Consistent with previous re- 
search (Fein, 1991; Hilton et al., 1993) it was predicted that suspicious sub- 
jects  would be willing to draw inferences  from the behavior  that  
corresponded to the behavior, thereby disconfirming the negative expec- 
tancy. The primary question addressed in this study, however, was whether 
even in situations such as t h e s e - - i n  which perceivers accept the target's 
behavior as genuine--suspicion might have some lingering effects on per- 
ceivers' feelings toward the target. Specifically, perceivers' suspicions about 
the target's motives may color their thoughts and feelings concerning the 
target ~ particularly when the target's behavior and potential ulterior mo- 
tives are directed toward them (as in Study l ) ~ d e s p i t e  the fact that they 
are willing to draw correspondent inferences from his or her behavior. 
To examine this prediction, an elaborate cover story was created so 
that each subject would think that he or she was interacting with another 
subject, and that some subjects would have reason to suspect the motives 
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of their partner. Their partner's behavior, however, was constructed so that 
it would seem rather implausible that it could be accounted for by the ul- 
terior motives alone. The degree to which subjects drew correspondent in- 
ferences from the target's behavior was assessed via interval-type scales. 
Subjects' negative feelings about the target were assessed with an open- 
ended measure. It was predicted that, although suspicious subjects would 
be willing to draw correspondent inferences from the target's behavior, they 
would be more likely than nonsuspicious subjects to indicate negative feel- 
ings about him on the open-ended, unrestricted measure. 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty undergraduate students at Williams College participated in this 
study for credit toward their Introductory Psychology course. Due to prob- 
lems with the electronic mail system used during the study, the data from 
two of these subjects were dropped from all analyses. 
Preexperirnent Instructions to Subjects 
When subjects were contacted by phone to arrange the time and lo- 
cation for the study, they were told that the study was about variables that 
affect the typical job interview. The subjects were instructed to ask a room- 
mate, friend, or acquaintance to write a letter consisting of one or two 
paragraphs about one of the subject's best qualities and one of the subject's 
worst qualities. They were instructed to tell the writer not to mention any 
real names, to type the letter and put it in a sealed envelope, and to sign 
their name across the seal so that the contents of the letter would remain 
confidential. Finally, the subjects were told not to look at the letter at any 
point or to ask what was written in it. 
Cover Story and Instructions 
When subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were put into individual 
cubicles and were told that the study would involve simulating a job inter- 
view in order to enable the researchers to examine a variety of variables 
in the job interview situation. The subjects then read that some subjects 
in each session would be asked to play the role of an interviewer and others 
would be asked to play the role of a job candidate. The subjects had no 
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way of knowing how many other subjects were being run in the same ses- 
sion. The experimenter indicated that there were several pairs of subjects 
being run simultaneously and that each subject would be paired randomly 
with another subject. In reality, only one or two subjects were run at a 
time, and each subject was told that he or she was randomly selected to 
be an interviewer. The subjects read that in this particular version of the 
study, all subjects would be put into individual cubicles so that the inter- 
viewer and job candidate would not be able to see or hear each other. The 
ostensible purpose of this was to isolate the content of what the candidate 
might say and partition out any "peripheral factors" such as physical ap- 
pearance, tone of voice, and so forth. It was explained to the subjects that 
all communication between candidates and interviewers would be done via 
electronic mail. 
The subjects read that another variable examined in the study con- 
cerned the structure of the interview. They were told that in this version 
of the study, interviewers would ask prepared questions, in the order in 
which the questions were presented for them, but that they would have 
some opportunities to ask their own "follow-up" questions for purposes of 
clarification. 
Subjects next read that in order to simulate a real job interview situ- 
ation, the experimenter was offering to the subjects who played the role 
of job candidates an incentive to try to do their best. The subjects read 
that all subjects who played the role of job candidates would be told that 
the three candidates during the course of the study who earned the most 
positive evaluations from the interviewers would each win $20. The subjects 
read that the experimenter also wanted the subjects who played the role 
of job interviewers to take their roles seriously, but that it was more difficult 
to assess their performance. To measure their performance, it was alleged 
that the transcripts of their interviews would be given to two professors 
from a nearby Business School, and that the two interviewers whose as- 
sessments of their candidates were closest to those made by the professors 
would each win $10. 
Creation of Negative Expectancy 
The subjects read that one aspect of real interviews is that the inter- 
viewer often reads letters of reference about the candidate before the in- 
terview. The experimenter then brought the letter concerning their partner 
(i.e., the job candidate) to the subject. The letter was ostensibly from some- 
one who had just started to get to know the candidate during the semester. 
The first paragraph of the letter emphasized that the candidate was easy 
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to get along with, down to earth, and able to handle the pressures and 
stresses of college better than most. The second paragraph went on to sug- 
gest that the candidate might not be well rounded and culturally literate, 
but it left open the strong possibility that this assessment may not have 
been valid and instead may reflect the particular limited interaction be- 
tween the candidate and the letter writer (e.g., see Fein, 1991, Study 4). 
After the subjects had read the letter, the experimenter came into 
the subjects' cubicles and explained that before they could conduct the job 
interview, they would need to know what the job entailed and what qualities 
they should be looking for in a candidate. They were given a profile enti- 
tled, "Ideal Qualifications for Job Candidates." In addition to emphasizing 
that the candidate must be intelligent, reliable, a good writer, and organ- 
ized, this profile indicated that, "The job will require a great deal of in- 
teraction with many different people, so it is crucial that the person be 
very well rounded. Thus, the ideal candidate would be engaging and inter- 
esting, able to actively participate in conversations about a wide variety of 
topics. He or she should seem knowledgeable and well-rounded, able to 
offer educated opinions about numerous topics." 
Manipulation of suspicion 
The subjects were assigned randomly to either the high-suspicion or the 
low-suspicion condition. The independent variable was manipulated through 
information concerning the job candidate's awareness of both the letter of 
reference and the ideal candidate profile. For the subjects in the high-suspi- 
cion condition, the letter of reference was presented in an envelope that ap- 
parently had never been sealed. Moreover, when the experimenter came into 
the subjects' cubicles to give them the letter, she looked concerned. She asked 
the subjects if the person who had called them to schedule the experimental 
session had instructed them to tell their letter writer to seal and sign the 
envelope and not reveal its contents to them. When the subjects indicated 
that these were indeed the instructions given to them, the experimenter ex- 
plained briefly that there apparently had been some confusion about this "by 
some of the subjects in the other rooms." The letter given to the subjects in 
the low-suspicion condition was in a signed and sealed envelope, and no men- 
tion of confusion about the instructions was made to the subjects. 3 
In addition to this variation which was designed to cause subjects in 
the high-suspicion condition to suspect that their job candidate may have 
read the letter, another variation concerned the candidate's awareness of 
~Fhe letters that the subjects brought to the lab were never read by anyone; rather, they were 
shredded at the conclusion of the experiment. 
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the contents of the profile concerning the ideal qualifications for a job can- 
didate. In the low-suspicion condition, the profile ended with the statement, 
"Because we did not want it to influence the candidate's interview re- 
sponses, we have not given the candidate any information about the quali- 
fications for the job." In the high-suspicion condition, in contrast, the 
profile stated, "Because we did not want it to influence the candidate's 
interview responses, we have not given the candidate all of this specific 
information. Rather, we have simply told candidates that they should be 
intelligent, responsible, and intellectually and culturally well rounded." This 
information was designed so that the subjects in the high-suspicion condi- 
tion, who had reason to suspect that the candidate may have read that his 
letter called into question how intellectually and culturally well rounded 
he was, would suspect that the job candidate would be particularly moti- 
vated to try to appear to disconfirm sharply the negative expectancy about 
him so that he would have a chance to qualify for the job. 
The Interview 
After the subjects read the ideal qualifications for a job candidate, the 
experimenter explained the electronic mail system and how the interview 
would proceed. The subjects were given a list of 10 interview questions that 
they were supposed to ask, in the order presented. The experimenter also 
explained that at various points during the interview, she would interrupt the 
interview and ask the interviewer to complete an assessment of the candidate. 
In reality, the experimenter was at a central computer and replied to 
the subjects' interview questions with prepared responses. The critical ques- 
tion was the third: "What kinds of extracurricular interests do you have?" 
The candidate's reply was designed to disconfirm the negative expectancy 
created by the letter writer about how well rounded and culturally literate 
he was. It emphasized the many intellectual and cultural interests that the 
candidate had and suggested that many of his acquaintances might not 
know that side of him. The reply was meant to be strong and detailed 
enough so that it would imply real knowledge about these interests. For 
the subjects who had reason to suspect the candidate's motives for trying 
to appear to be well versed in the arts and culture, the nature of the reply 
and the circumstances in which it was elicited should have caused them to 
infer that the motive alone could not account sufficiently for the candidate's 
interview performance. 4 
4It should be noted that the high-suspicion subjects did not learn any information that 
suggested that the candidate was n o t  motivated to try to present himself in a misleading or 
self-enhancing way. Thus, they should have continued to be suspicious of the candidate, while 
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Dependent Measures 
After the candidate's reply to the third interview question was re- 
ceived by the subjects, the experimenter entered the subjects' cubicles and 
explained that this was one of those times in which she would interrupt 
the interview and ask the interviewer to evaluate the candidate. The sub- 
jects were given a brief questionnaire. In addition to a few filler items, the 
questions asked subjects to rate the candidate on 9-point scales concerning 
his knowledge and interest in culture, his ability to interact well with a 
variety of different people, and his well roundedness. The subjects were 
also asked to list any negative traits or qualities that they thought might 
be characteristic of the candidate, and they were given some blank space 
on the questionnaire in which to write any responses. 
When subjects had completed these measures, they were told that 
the study was over, and they were debriefed fully. Two subjects were chosen 
at random to receive $10. 
Results and Discussion 
The principle predictions were that the manipulation of  suspicion 
would have weak or no effects on subjects' ratings of the candidate on 
dimensions relevant to the negative expectancy, but that the high-suspicion 
condition subjects would be more likely than the low-suspicion condition 
subjects to indicate negative concerns about the candidate on the open- 
ended measure. Consistent with the predictions, the results revealed that 
both high- and low-suspicion subjects were willing to infer that the candi- 
-date's personality corresponded to his interview performance on the di- 
mensions that were relevant to the negative expectancy. As Table I 
indicates, on the ratings of the candidate's interest and knowledge in cul- 
tural activities, his ability to interact well with a variety of different people, 
and his well roundedness, subjects in the high-suspicion condition were as 
inferring that the candidate's response to the critical interview question reflected his true 
interests. It should also be noted why the low-suspicion condition in this study is not called 
the "no-suspicion" condition. It was reasoned that some of the subjects in this condition 
would likely become somewhat suspicious when they noted that the letter called into question 
how well rounded the candidate was, that being well rounded was an important job 
qualification, and that the candidate's interview response emphasized that he was indeed 
quite well rounded. The quality and detail of the interview response, however, coupled with 
the apparent safeguards against the candidate becoming aware of the contents of the letter 
or the ideal profile, was designed so that it would render an ulterior motive based attribution 
relatively implausible. 
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Table I. Mean Ratings of the Candidate and Percentage of Subjects Who Indicated 
Negative Qualities 
High suspicion Low suspicion t 
Mean ratings of the candidate on 9-point scale 
Cultural interests and knowledge 5.67 6.00 < 1.00 
Ability to interact with variety of people 7.00 7.62 1.59 
Well roundedness 6.40 6.20 <1.00 
Open-ended responses 
% who listed negative qualities 60.00 23.08 3.88 a 
azz; p < .05. 
willing as the subjects in the low-suspicion condition to rate the candidate 
positively, suggesting that they did not dismiss his interview response as 
completely suspect. Thus, although they had reason to suspect that the can- 
didate was aware of the negative expectancy and of the job qualifications 
and, therefore, may have been motivated to try to disconfirm this expec- 
tancy, there was no evidence that subjects in the high-suspicion condition 
held this against him when they rated him along dimensions relevant to 
the expectancy. 
In contrast, when they filled out the open-ended measure, subjects 
in the high-suspicion condition were more likely to list negative qualities 
about the candidate. As can be seen in Table I, a majority of the subjects 
in the high-suspicion condition did volunteer a negative trait or quality 
about the candidate, whereas fewer than one fourth of the subjects in the 
low-suspicion condition did so. All but two of the qualities listed concerned 
subjects' suspicions about the candidate. The most frequent responses were, 
"trying to impress," "insincere," and responses indicating that the subjects 
suspected that he was saying things that he knew the interviewer was look- 
ing for. 
These results suggest that when asked to make inferences that directly 
related to the expectancy, even the subjects who had good reason to suspect 
the motives of the candidate were willing to accept that the candidate's 
response did reflect his true interests. When not limited to making infer- 
ences simply about the dimensions relevant to the expectancy and interview 
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response, however, the responses given by these subjects revealed that their 
suspicions about the candidate remained strong and rather salient. 
STUDY 3 
The subjects in the first two studies were presented with cover stories 
and experimental situations that were more detailed and involving than 
those found in most previous studies concerning suspicion. Study 3 was 
designed to examine more directly whether the degree of involvement that 
subjects have in the task can play an important role in determining the 
effects of  suspicion. To this end, subjects in the study read information 
about three individuals who were candidates for a job and their task was 
to determine which candidate would be best suited for the job. Some of 
the subjects were given reason to be suspicious of the motives underlying 
the behavior of one of the candidates. For some of these subjects, the ex- 
perimental task was designed to be involving and to make them feel ac- 
countable (e.g., Tetlock, 1985) and motivated to be accurate. For the other 
subjects who had reason to be suspicious, the experimental task was de- 
signed to be minimally involving. 
For all subjects, the candidate about whom suspicions were sometimes 
raised was clearly the most qualified for the job along a series of dimensions 
(e.g., his intelligence). A set of questions addressed in this study, therefore, 
was whether suspicion about this candidate would cause subjects to reject 
him despite his otherwise impressive credentials, and whether this effect 
would vary as a function of the involvement of the subjects in their infer- 
ential task. One possibility was that their greater motivation for accuracy 
would make suspicious subjects in the high-involvement condition more 
likely to choose the candidate in question because of his obvious superiority 
to the other candidates. A second possibility was that their greater involve- 
ment in the task would make these subjects particularly wary of dismissing 
their suspicions. That is, they would be very hesitant to allow themselves 
to be duped by this candidate and thus might make a more conservative 
choice and choose a candidate whose credentials were not as strong but 
whose motives were not in question. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the suspicion elicited in this study was 
not created by anything that the candidate did, but rather by the context 
of the candidate's behavior. To the extent that subjects in this study would 
reject this candidate because of their suspicions, the study would illustrate 
the very difficult position in which targets of suspicion may find themselves. 
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Through no fault of the targets per se, suspicious perceivers may be un- 
willing to accept their behavior at face value. 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-nine undergraduate students at Williams College participated in 
this study for credit toward their Introductory Psychology course. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in groups of three. When all three subjects arrived 
at the laboratory, they were told that the study concerned the effects of 
different kinds of communication on group processes. The experimenter 
explained the cover story to the group, and then placed each subject into 
his or her own small room. The specific instructions for the subjects' tasks, 
and all stimulus materials and dependent measures, were presented to the 
subjects in a series of booklets. Subjects completed these materials indi- 
vidually. 
Design 
Each group of three subjects was assigned randomly to one of three 
conditions. Subjects in the suspicion/high-involvement condition and sub- 
jects in the no-suspicion/high-involvement condition were given a cover 
story and set of instructions that indicated that the study was a simulation 
of a complex group decision-making process, that their individual perform- 
antes would be scrutinized by the other subjects, and that the decisions 
made by each of the subjects would affect the outcome (i.e., the chance 
to win money) of the other subjects in their group. The subjects in the 
former condition were given reason to be suspicious of a target individual, 
whereas the subjects in the latter condition were not. Subjects in the sus- 
picion/low-involvement condition, like the subjects in the suspicion/high-in- 
volvement condition, were given reason to suspect the motives of a target 
person, but these subjects received a much simpler cover story which was 
designed to minimize subjects' feelings of accountability or outcome de- 
pendency. 
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Cover Story: High-Involvement Conditions 
Subjects in the two high-involvement conditions were told that their 
tasks would be to play the roles of executives in an organization, and that 
part of their jobs was to make important decisions regarding personnel. 
The three subjects in each session were told that they each would be asked 
to evaluate different candidates for various jobs and that their tasks were 
to recommend particular candidates to the other subjects in their group, 
as well as to evaluate the recommendations given them by these other sub- 
jects. The experimenter next explained that to encourage each group of 
subjects to do the best job they could, an award of $24 would be given to 
the group of subjects in the study whose decisions were the most accurate. 
The experimenter asked the subjects to decide together on a name for their 
organization and explained that the name of the winning group would be 
announced in their introductory psychology class at the end of the semester. 
The experimenter then gave the subjects a set of written instructions. 
These instructions emphasized information that was designed to make the 
subjects feel accountable to each other for their decisions. Through a cover 
story similar to that used in Study 2, the subjects were led to believe that 
their decisions would be compared against those made by a panel of experts 
who would have not only the information that the subjects would have but 
a more complete package of information about each candidate. The sub- 
jects' task, therefore, was to try to use the information that they did have 
about the candidates and recommend the best person for the job. The sub- 
jects learned that each of their decisions could earn or cost the group some 
amount of points; the better the decisions, the more points would be 
earned. They also read that the winning group would split the money 
evenly. Finally, the subjects read that at the end of each session, the ex- 
perimenter would discuss with each group their individual decisions and 
what the optimal decisions were. 
Cover Story: Low-Involvement Condition 
Subjects in the suspicion/low-involvement condition saw the other 
subjects in their group only long enough for them all to hear the experi- 
menter indicate that the study concerned the effects of different kinds of 
communication on group processes. The information presented to these 
subjects was designed to minimize any feelings of accountability or outcome 
dependency. These subjects were told nothing, therefore, of money to be 
won or what the other subjects were doing. There was no explicit mention 
of comParing their decisions with anyone else's, and the subjects were as- 
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sured that all of their responses would be anonymous and confidential. 
They were told that they would read the materials, make their recommen- 
dations, and then be dismissed from the study. 
Job Description 
All subjects read a detailed description of the job ("Account Execu- 
tive") for which they were to recommend the best candidate. The descrip- 
tion concerned a number of qualities, such as intelligence, organization, 
reliability, and experience. Among the qualities emphasized were a number 
of factors concerning the ability to work well with o t h e r s - - t o  be a good 
"team player." Subjects in the two suspicion conditions read that "the job 
description was sent to each candidate a few days before their interviews 
so that they would have a more complete understanding of what the job 
entails." Subjects in the no-suspicion condition did not read anything about 
whether or not the candidates saw this description. 
Information About the Candidates 
All subjects received information about the same set of three candi- 
dates. For each candidate, the subjects received a resume, two letters of 
recommendation, and "edited transcripts" from the candidate's job interview 
for this position. The set of information about one of these three candidates, 
named "Jonathan Matthews," was designed to be much more impressive 
than were the sets of information about the other two candidates. Matthews 
had the best academic record by far, overwhelmingly positive letters of rec- 
ommendation, the most astute interview responses, and previous jobs that 
made him the best prepared for the job. The other two candidates had av- 
erage academic records, lukewarm letters, and less preparation. 
In addition to all of the very positive information about Matthews, 
however, subjects in the two suspicion conditions were given some infor- 
mation about Matthews that was designed to elicit suspicion. In an other- 
wise glowing letter, one of  the two letters recommending Matthews 
included the following: 
If Mr. Matthews has an observable flaw, it is that he does not suffer fools gladly. 
That  is, he does not tolerate work that has been handed to him by others which 
does not meet his standards, nor does he accept easily situations in which the work 
he has given to others does not progress in the way he had envisioned . . . .  Thus, 
while this management style may be abrasive to some of the more sensitive people 
who will work under him, I think that his skills, enthusiasm, and high standards 
would serve as an inspiration to others, and I have no doubt that he would make 
a very effective, demanding, and ultimately very productive leader. 
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Embedded in the job interview that subjects read later, Matthews claimed 
that he did indeed like to work with others, and that he greatly enjoyed 
being part of a team. Matthews did state, however, that he did not "like 
to work with others who, well, who don't carry their weight." Because the 
subjects in the suspicion conditions had read that all the candidates were 
aware of the qualities called for in the job description, which included an 
emphasis on the ability to engage in a great deal of teamwork and coop- 
eration, and because they had also read that one of his letters indicated 
that he might have trouble working in groups, the interview response was 
designed so that subjects would be suspicious that Matthews was not en- 
tirely sincere in his statements about working with others as part of a team. 
Subjects in the no-suspicion condition, in contrast, did not read that 
the candidates were aware of the job description, and the information in 
the letter that called into question Matthews' style of supervising others 
was deleted. All of the other information, however, was identical. 
Dependent Measure 
After the subjects had read all of the information, they were given a 
sheet of paper containing each of the three candidates' names. Information 
on the bottom of the page reminded subjects in the two high-involvement 
conditions that their recommendation would be shown to the other sub- 
jects. The subjects were asked to circle the name of the candidate whom 
they would recommend for the job. 
After completing this measure, subjects were told that the study was 
over, and they were debriefed fully. One group of three subjects was chosen 
at random to receive $24. 
Results and Discussion 
A chi-square test revealed that the independent variable had a sig- 
nificant effect on which candidates the subjects chose for the job, X 2 (4, N 
--- 69) = 18.92, p < .001. Not surprisingly, subjects in the no-suspicion/high- 
involvement condi t ion- -who never received the information suggesting 
that Matthews might have an interaction style ill-suited for j o b - - w e r e  
more likely to choose Matthews for the job (78.26% of these subjects) than 
were subjects in the suspicion/high-involvement condition (29.17%), X 2 (2, 
N = 47) = 17.74, p < .001. 
This result suggests that the suspicions raised in the experiment were 
enough to cause subjects to discount the large body of other information 
that suggested clearly that Matthews was the most qualified candidate for 
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the job in question. When the subjects believed that they would be ac- 
countable for their judgments, their suspicions about this candidate made 
them hesitate to take a chance on trusting him and so they tended to 
choose a less qualified candidate about whom they had no reason to dis- 
trust. 
Taken from the perspective of the perceiver, this result is not very 
troubling. The combination of the information contained in the letter, the 
context of the interview, and the interview response made an ulterior mo- 
tive explanation very plausible. In light of the suspicion that this raised, 
the subjects could not be sure if any of the information about the candidate 
could be trusted completely. Taken from the perspective of the target of 
suspicion, however, these results are particularly distressing. A lifetime of 
experiences that led to the positive set of information in the candidate's 
file was discounted in favor of a potentially uninformed remark in the midst 
of a very positive letter, taken together with the context of the candidate's 
behavior that the candidate himself did nothing to create. 
Of greater interest to the thesis presented in this paper is the com- 
parison between subjects in the suspicion/high-involvement condition and 
the suspicion/low-involvement condition. Consistent with the notion that 
greater involvement leads to greater wariness on the part of suspicious per- 
ceivers, suspicious subjects in the high-involvement condition were less 
likely to choose the target (29.17%) than were suspicious subjects in the 
low-involvement condition (54.45%), Z2 (2, N = 46) = 5.76, p < .06. This 
finding suggests that when perceivers have reason to suspect that they could 
be deceived by the actor and have to pay some price for this deception, 
their impressions of the actor may be especially likely to be affected by 
the plausibility of  ulterior motive attributions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In each of the studies reported in this paper, the suspicions raised 
about the true motives or genuineness of the actor's behaviors stemmed 
from contextual information surrounding the behavior, rather than from 
the behavior itself. In Study 1, these suspicions resulted in suspended judg- 
ment about the extent to which the actor's true attitude corresponded to 
the attitude expressed in his speech, but they made the subjects see the 
actor as significantly less likeable. Although these subjects did not tend to 
conclude that the actor was indeed untrustworthy, the plausibility of the 
explanation that the actor was trying to deceive the subjects may have been 
great enough that the subjects tended to feel more negatively toward the 
actor. This pattern of results was in some ways even stronger in Study 2. 
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The results of this study suggest that the high plausibility that the actor 
may have had ulterior motives caused subjects to have negative concerns 
about the actor's sincerity even though the actor's behavior was strong and 
clear enough to convince subjects that the behavior could not be explained 
adequately by these ulterior motives. Thus, while they were making infer- 
ences about the actor that suggested that they took his behavior at face 
value, the subjects' distrust of the actor continued to emerge and influence 
their thoughts and feelings about him. Finally, the results of Study 3 illus- 
trate that the negative effects of suspicion can emerge on dependent meas- 
ures that were centrally important to the inferential task faced by the 
subjects, and they also suggest that these negative effects are more likely 
to emerge if perceivers feel particularly involved in and accountable for 
this inferential task. 
Other Negative Effects of Suspicion 
The negative effects of suspicion are by no means limited to those 
examined in the present research. The attributional thinking elicited by sus- 
picion is likely to result in a variety of costs to the perceiver and to the 
target. For example, the relatively great amount of cognitive resources de- 
voted to attributional analyses may tax perceivers' resources needed for 
other tasks. Interviewers who are dissecting a job candidate's interview re- 
sponses to look for cues relevant to their suspicions, for example, may miss 
important information about the candidate on dimensions that are not rele- 
vant to the attributional task in which they are engaged. Moreover, in any 
interaction in which one of the interactants has reason to be suspicious of 
the motives of another, suspicion may have a strong effect on both the 
perceiver and the target of the suspicion. The cognitive resources that sus- 
picious perceivers devote to attributional analyses may interfere with their 
ability to carry on the interaction smoothly and successfully (e.g., Gilbert 
& Jones, 1986; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Neuberg, Judice, Virdin, 
& Carrillo, 1993). Suspicious perceivers may not be able or care to hide 
their suspicions from the target of their suspicions. They may act in a more 
cold and distant way, perhaps guarding themselves from any self-disclosures 
that the target potentially could use to his or her advantage. This set of 
behaviors is likely to create a vicious circle in which the perceivers' suspi- 
cions lead the target to behave in strange ways, thus reinforcing the per- 
ceivers' suspicions. 
Even when a target of suspicion is successful in behaving in such a 
way that cannot easily be discounted as reflective of ulterior motives, the 
target may continue to be under the shadow of suspicion for some time 
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to come. Based on the thoughts that they indicated about the job candidate, 
it seems that the suspicious subjects in Study 2 of the present paper would 
have had a much lower threshold for becoming suspicious of the actor's 
subsequent behaviors than would the subjects who had not been given rea- 
son to be suspicious in the first place. More generally, it is possible that 
to the extent that their original suspicions are strong, perceivers are primed 
to perceive potential ulterior motives underlying an actor's future behaviors 
even if the original source of the suspicion proves groundless. This may be 
particularly damning for certain groups of people, such as individuals who 
are the targets of well-known and negative expectancies as a result of a 
stereotype or stigma. Because many perceivers are likely to suspect that 
these individuals would be particularly motivated to act in ways that appear 
to disconfirm these expectancies, the expectancy-inconsistent behaviors that 
these individuals may exhibit are likely to arouse suspicion (e.g., Fein, 1991; 
Hilton et al., 1993). Moreover, even when their specific behaviors cannot 
easily be discounted as misrepresentations of their true selves because of 
ulterior motives, the suspicion that these individuals do have such motives 
is likely to endure. Compounding the situation, research by Crocker, Major, 
and their colleagues has shown that stigmatized or stereotyped individuals 
are likely to have their own frequent suspicions about the perceivers' re- 
sponses toward them (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Crocker, 
1993), thus interfering further with the interactions between the perceivers 
and the targets. 
Moderating Factors 
The positive effects of suspicion on perceivers' inferences and attribu- 
tional processing seem to be very robust across situations. That is, across 
a variety of contexts and behaviors, the research on suspicion has shown 
that the presence of even a small amount of information that suggests that 
an actor's behavior may have been influenced by ulterior motives can help 
subjects avoid the correspondence bias, and yet not inhibit their willingness 
to make correspondent inferences when there is no plausible reason for 
them to suspend their judgment of the actor. The negative consequences 
of suspicion as illustrated in the present research, however, are more likely 
to depend on a number of variables. 
The results of the present study suggest that one such variable is the 
degree to which the perceivers feel that the actions and/or motives of an 
actor may affect them in some way. More generally, the relationship be- 
tween the perceiver and the actor is likely to play a very important role. 
People who are in competition with an actor may be especially likely to 
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be affected by the plausibility of ulterior motive explanations for the actor's 
behavior and thus see him or her in a very negative light, even if they are 
forced to admit that their original suspicions were ill-founded. In addition, 
partners in an intimate relationship may be particularly susceptible to the 
negative effects of suspicion that result in behaviors that tend to produce 
vicious circles and lowered thresholds for future suspicions (e.g., McCor- 
nack & Levine, 1990). 
Moreover, the type of relationship between the perceiver and actor 
may interact with the type of ulterior motive in question in determining 
the negative effects of suspicion. For example, if the ulterior motives in 
question concern ingratiation, perceivers who are the recipients of these 
actions may be less likely to see the actor in a negative light than would 
more distant observers (e.g., Jones, 1964). On the other hand, if the ulterior 
motives concern sabotage, rather than ingratiation, the perceptions of those 
who are more directly involved are likely to be more strongly tainted by 
their suspicions. 
Other factors such as the goals of the perceiver (Hilton & Darley, 
1991; Neuberg, 1989), the perceiver's recent experiences (e.g., has the per- 
ceiver been deceived recently?), the norms of the situation, and whether 
the perceiver is alone or is part of a group may each influence how costly 
a perceiver's suspicions may be. In addition, a number of individual differ- 
ences may play a role, such as differences on the dimensions of need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987), and 
n e e d  for closure (e.g., Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). Finally, there 
are likely to be cultural differences. For example, to the extent that the 
people in a culture acknowledge and appreciate the role of external, situ- 
ational factors in determining individuals' behavior (e.g., J. Miller, 1984), 
recognizing potential ulterior motives may be much less likely to result in 
negative consequences for perceivers or actors. 
Conclusion 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the terms used to describe the cor- 
respondence bias is the overattribution effect. Although the term refers to 
the tendency to overattribute an actor's behavior to his or her disposition 
(and thus underattribute it to situational factors), the correspondence bias, 
according to the models outlined previously, reflects perceivers' tendency 
to engage in insufficient attributional thinking. In the years after the classic 
early social psychological models of the attribution process were first pro- 
posed by Heider, Jones, Kelley, and their colleagues (e.g., Heider, 1958; 
Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1973), the metaphor of the perceiver 
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as "naive scientist" determined to use the available information to assess 
causality and so make his or her world more predictable was replaced by 
the "cognitive miser" who would engage spontaneously in attributional de- 
liberations only under relatively unusual conditions (e.g., Hastie, 1984; We- 
iner, 1985). These triggers of attributional thinking tend to be, at least in 
part, factors that perceivers bring to their perception of the actor, rather 
than factors inherent in the information about the actor and/or the context 
of the actor's behavior. The research on suspicion suggests that suspicion 
is another trigger of attributional thinking, but one that stems from the 
information itself. 
The set of studies reported in the present paper, however, suggests 
that the heightened attributional thinking and attention to plausibility that 
is associated with suspicion can result in both positive and negative conse- 
quences. When perceivers have reason to distrust the genuineness or rep- 
resentativeness of an actor's behavior, they are likely to draw inferences 
about the actor's true attitudes that reflect a relatively sophisticated style of 
attributional processing. That is, they avoid the correspondence bias and 
suspend judgment about the actor on dimensions for which the behavior in 
question suggests multiple, and plausibly rival, dispositions. Their more gen- 
eral feelings or thoughts about the actor, however, may be tainted by their 
suspicion. Particularly when perceivers believe that the actions or motives 
of the actor could affect them, suspecting the motives of an actor may cause 
the perceivers to see the actor in a more negative light, even if they are not 
convinced that the actor's behavior was indeed affected by ulterior motives. 
Suspicion, therefore, can help perceivers avoid the biases that stem, in part, 
from a lack of attributionai thinking, but in some circumstances it also may 
result in biased impressions of actors that result from too much thinking 
about the plausible ulterior-motive-based attributions. 
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